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The standard assumptions that underlie many conceptual and quantitative frameworks do not
hold for many complex physical, biological, and social systems. Complex systems science clarifies
when and why such assumptions fail and provides alternative frameworks for understanding the
properties of complex systems. This review introduces some of the basic principles of complex
systems science, including complexity profiles, the tradeoff between efficiency and adaptability, the
necessity of matching the complexity of systems to that of their environments, multi-scale analy-
sis, and evolutionary processes. Our focus is on the general properties of systems as opposed to
the modeling of specific dynamics; rather than provide a comprehensive review, we pedagogically
describe a conceptual and analytic approach for understanding and interacting with the complex
systems of our world. With the exception of a few footnotes, this paper assumes only a high school
mathematical and scientific background, so that it may be accessible to academics in all fields,
decision-makers in industry, government, and philanthropy, and anyone who is interested in systems
and society.
I. INTRODUCTION
How can we scientifically approach the study of com-
plex systems—physical, biological, and social? Empirical
studies, while useful, are by themselves insufficient, since
all experiments require a theoretical framework in which
they can be interpreted. While many such frameworks
exist for understanding particular components or aspects
of systems, the standard assumptions that underlie most
quantitative studies often do not hold for systems as a
whole, resulting in a mischaracterization of the causes
and consequences of large-scale behavior.
This paper provides an introduction to complex sys-
tems science, demonstrating a few of its applications and
its capacity to help us make more effective decisions in
the complex systems of our world. It focuses on some
general properties of complex systems, rather than on the
modeling of specific dynamics as in the subfields of dy-
namical systems, agent-based modeling and cellular au-
tomata, network science, and chaos theory. Section II
introduces key concepts, including complexity profiles,
the tradeoff between efficiency and adaptability, and the
necessity of matching the complexity of systems to that
of their environments. Section III considers the anal-
ysis of complex systems, attending to the oft-neglected
question of when standard assumptions do and—more
importantly—do not apply. Section IV discusses princi-
ples for effectively intervening in complex systems given
that their full descriptions are often beyond the limits of
human comprehension. Section V provides further read-
ing. Section VI concludes.
∗ Corresponding author. Email: asiegenf@mit.edu
II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF COMPLEX
SYSTEMS SCIENCE
A. Why complex systems science?
Complex systems science considers systems with many
components. These systems could be physical, biolog-
ical, or social. Given this diversity of systems, it may
seem strange to study them all under one framework.
But while most scientific disciplines tend to focus on the
components themselves, complex systems science focuses
on how the components within a system are related to
one another [1]. For instance, while most academic dis-
ciplines would group the systems in fig. 1 by column,
complex systems science groups them by row.
Systems may differ from each other not because of dif-
ferences in their parts but because of differences in how
these parts depend on and affect one another. For ex-
ample, steam and ice are composed of identical water
molecules but, due to differences in the interactions be-
tween the molecules, have very different properties. Con-
versely, all gasses share many behaviors in common de-
spite differences in their constituent molecules. The same
holds for solids and liquids. The behaviors that dis-
tinguish solids from liquids from gasses are examples of
emergence: they cannot be determined from a system’s
parts individually. Fluid turbulence, as one might ob-
serve in a flowing river, is an example of how the relation-
ships between parts can give rise to emergent large-scale
behaviors and patterns that are self-organized, meaning
that they arise not from some external or centralized con-
trol but rather autonomously from the interactions be-
tween the system components [2–6]. Other examples of
self-organized behaviors include the spontaneous forma-
tion of conversation groups at a party, the allocation of
goods in a decentralized economy, the evolution of ecosys-
tems, and the flocking of birds. Such large-scale behav-
iors and patterns cannot be determined by examining
each system part in isolation. By instead considering
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FIG. 1. From ref. [7]. Each column contains three examples of
systems consisting of the same components (from left to right:
molecules, cells, people) but with different relations between
them. Each row contains systems representing a certain kind
of relationship between components. For random systems, the
behavior of each component is independent from the behav-
ior of all other components. For coherent systems, all com-
ponents exhibit the same behavior; for example, the behavior
(location, orientation, and velocity) of one part of the cannon-
ball completely determines the behavior of the other parts.
Correlated systems lie between these two extremes, such that
the behaviors of the system’s components do depend on one
another, but not so strongly that every component acts in the
same way; for example, the shape of one part of a snowflake is
correlated with but does not completely determine the shape
of the other parts. (Implicit in these descriptions is the ne-
cessity of specifying the set of behaviors under consideration,
as discussed in section II B.)
general properties of systems as wholes, complex systems
science provides an interdisciplinary scientific framework
that allows for the discovery of new ideas, applications,
and connections.
A full description of all the small-scale details of even
relatively simple systems is impossible; therefore sound
analyses must describe only those properties of systems
that do not depend on all these details. That such prop-
erties exist is due to universality, a phenomenon that will
be discussed in section III. Statistical physics provides an
underlying insight that allows for the discovery of such
properties: namely, that while attempting to characterize
the behavior of a particular state of a system (e.g. a gas)
may be entirely intractable, characterizing the set of all
possible states of the system may not only be tractable
but may also provide us with a model of the relevant in-
formation (e.g. the pressure, temperature, density, com-
pressibility, etc.). In other words, taking a step back
and considering the space of possible behaviors provides
a powerful analytical lens that can be applied not only to
physical systems but also to biological and social ones.
B. What is complexity?
We define the complexity of a behavior as equal to the
length of its description. The length of a description of
a particular system’s behavior depends on the number
of possible behaviors that system could exhibit [8]. For
example, a light bulb that has two possible states—either
on or off—can be described by a single bit: 0 or 1. Two
bits can describe four different behaviors (00, 01, 10, or
11), three bits can describe eight behaviors, and so on.
Mathematically, we can write C = log2N , where C is the
complexity of a system and N is its number of possible
behaviors,1 but for our purposes here, it is sufficient to
state that the greater the number of possible behaviors,
the greater the complexity.
It is important to note that one must carefully define
the space of possible behaviors. For instance, if we are
interested in a light bulb already in a socket, the light
bulb has two possible behaviors, as above, but if we are
instead interested in the complexity of building a light
bulb, the space of possible behaviors might include all of
the ways in which its parts could be arranged. As another
example, consider programming a computer to correctly
answer a multiple-choice question with four choices. At
first glance, this task is very simple: since there are four
possible behaviors, only two bits are required. Nonethe-
less, we have the sense that programming a computer to
score perfectly on a multiple-choice test would be quite
difficult. This apparent paradox is resolved, however,
when we recognize that such a task is difficult only be-
cause we do not a priori know what questions will be on
the test, and thus the true task is to be able to correctly
answer any multiple-choice question. This task is quite
complex, given the large number of possible ways the
program could respond to a string of arbitrary multiple-
choice questions.
C. Complexity and scale
Consider a human, and then consider a gas containing
the very same molecules that are in the human but in
1 Technically, log2N is actually an upper bound for the system’s
complexity since if some behaviors are more likely than others,
the average length of the system’s description can be reduced by
using shorter descriptions for the more common behaviors and
longer descriptions for the less common ones. (Lossless compres-
sion algorithms rely on this logic.)
3no particular arrangement. Which system is more com-
plex? The gas possesses a greater number of possible
arrangements of the molecules (i.e. has more entropy,
or disorder), and thus would take longer to describe at
a microscopic level. However, when we think of a com-
plex system, we think of the behaviors arising from the
ordered arrangement of molecules in a human, not the
behaviors arising from the maximally disordered arrange-
ment of molecules in a gas. It therefore may be tempting
to conclude that complex systems are those with reduced
disorder. But the systems with the least disorder are
those in which all components exhibit the same behavior
(coherent systems in fig. 1), and such behavior is easy to
describe and thus not intuitively complex.
To resolve this apparent paradox, we must consider
that the length of a system’s description depends on the
level of detail used to describe it. Thus, complexity de-
pends on scale. On a microscopic scale, it really is more
difficult to describe the positions and velocities of all the
molecules of the gas than it is to do the same for all
the molecules of the human. But at the scale of human
perception, the behaviors of a gas are determined by its
temperature and pressure, while the behaviors of a hu-
man remain quite complex. Entropy corresponds to the
amount of complexity at the smallest scale, but charac-
terizing a system requires understanding its complexity
across multiple scales. A system’s complexity profile is a
plot of the system’s complexity as a function of scale [9].
In the examples below, scale will be taken to be length,
but fundamentally, the scale of a behavior is equal to
the number of coordinated components involved in the
behavior, for which physical length is a proxy. A gas is
very simple at the scale of human perception because at
this scale, only behaviors involving trillions of molecules
are relevant, and there are relatively few distinguishable
behaviors of a gas involving so many molecules.
As shown in fig. 2, random, coherent, and correlated
systems (see fig. 1) have qualitatively different complex-
ity profiles. Random systems have the most complexity
at the smallest scale (finest granularity/most detail), but
the amount of complexity rapidly drops off as the scale
is increased and the random behaviors of the individual
components are averaged out. A coherent system has the
same amount of complexity at small scales as it does at
larger scales because describing the overall behavior of
the system (e.g. the position and velocity of a cannon-
ball) also describes the behavior of all the components
(e.g. the positions and velocities of all the atoms). Note
that complexity tends to increase (or remain the same) as
the scale decreases, since looking at a system in more de-
tail (while still including the whole system in the descrip-
tion) tends to yield more information. For a correlated
system, various behaviors occur at various scales, and
so the complexity gradually increases as one examines
the system in greater and greater detail. For instance,
from very far away a human, being barely visible, has
very little complexity. As the level of detail is gradually
increased, the description will first include the overall po-
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FIG. 2. Representative complexity profiles for random, co-
herent, and correlated systems (see fig. 1). Any given system
may have aspects of each at various scales.
sition and velocity of the human, and then the positions
and velocities of each limb, followed by the movement of
hands, fingers, facial expressions, as well as words that
the human may be saying. Continuing to greater levels
of detail, the organs and then tissues and patterns within
the human brain become relevant, and eventually so do
the individual cells. At scales smaller than that of a cell,
complexity further increases as one sees organelles (cel-
lular substructures), followed by large molecules such as
proteins and DNA, and then eventually smaller molecules
and individual atoms. At each level, the length of the de-
scription grows longer. This incredible multi-scale struc-
ture with gradually increasing complexity is a defining
characteristic of complex systems.
D. Tradeoffs between complexity and scale
The intuition that complex systems require order is not
unfounded: for there to be complexity at larger scales,
there must be behaviors involving the coordination of
many smaller-scale components. This coordination sup-
presses complexity at smaller scales because the behav-
iors of the smaller-scale components are now limited by
the interdependencies between them. The tension be-
tween small-scale and large-scale complexity can be made
precise: given a fixed set of components with a fixed set of
potential individual behaviors, the area under the com-
plexity profile will be constant, regardless of the interde-
pendencies (or lack thereof) between the components.2
2 Formally, the sum of a system’s complexity at each scale (i.e. the
area under its complexity profile) will equal the total complexity
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FIG. 3. The complexity profile of a factory that can produce
a large number of copies of a few types of goods, and the
complexity profile of a factory that can produce many types
of goods but not in large numbers. The number of copies
of a good produced is a proxy for scale since, given a fixed
technology, mass production requires larger-scale coordinated
action in the factory (e.g. an assembly line), and the number
of different types of goods that can be produced at a given
scale is a proxy for the number of different possible behaviors
of the factory—and thus its complexity—at that scale.
Thus, for any system, there is a fundamental tradeoff be-
tween the number of behaviors a system can have and
the scale of those behaviors.
For instance, consider a factory consisting of many
workers [7]. The output of the factory can be charac-
terized using a complexity profile (fig. 3). The number
of different types of goods that the factory can produce
at a given scale is a proxy for the factory’s complexity at
that scale, with the number of copies of the same type of
good that the factory can produce in a given amount of
time being a proxy for scale. The fundamental tradeoff
is evident in the fact that if the factory wants to be able
to churn out many copies of a single type of good in a
short amount of time, it will have to coordinate all of its
workers (perhaps having them work on an assembly line),
thereby reducing their individual freedom to make many
different kinds of goods. The factory’s production would
then have low complexity but at a large scale (e.g. churn-
ing out many identical Model-T Fords—“Any customer
can have a car painted any color that he wants so long as
it is black”). On the other hand, if the factory’s employ-
ees work independently, they will be able to create many
different types of products, but none at scale. Of course,
of its components, i.e. the sum of each individual component’s
complexity [9]. The complexity of an individual component is
related to the number of distinct behaviors of that component,
as described in section II B.
a factory may be able to increase both the complexity
and scale of its production by adding new machinery or
more workers; the precise tradeoff between complexity
and scale applies only when considering a fixed set of
components with a fixed set of individual behaviors.3
A corollary of the tradeoff between complexity and
scale is the tradeoff between adaptability and effi-
ciency [10–15]. Adaptability arises when there are many
possible actions happening in parallel that are mostly in-
dependent from one another, i.e. when the system has
high complexity. Efficiency, on the other hand, arises
when many parts of a system are all working in concert,
so that the system can perform the task for which it was
designed at the largest possible scale. Due to the trade-
off between complexity and scale, a system with more
adaptability will have a complexity profile with greater
complexity but predominantly at smaller scales, while a
system with more efficiency will have a complexity pro-
file with lower complexity but extending to larger scales.
Thus, a very efficient system will, due to its necessar-
ily lower complexity, not be as adaptable to unforeseen
variations within itself or its environment, while a very
adaptable system, designed to handle all sorts of shocks,
will necessarily have to sacrifice some larger-scale behav-
iors. The Soviets thought they could have their cake
and eat it, too: they originally believed that their econ-
omy would outperform capitalist ones because capitalist
economies have so much waste related to multiple busi-
nesses competing to do the same thing [16, Chapter 16].
It would be far more efficient to coordinate all economic
production. But in creating such large-scale economic
structures, lower-scale complexity was sacrificed, result-
ing in a non-adaptive system. (Improperly regulated cap-
italist systems may also sacrifice redundancy and adapt-
ability for efficiency, resulting in, for instance, excessive
concentrations of market power, harmful feedback loops,
and herd-like behaviors [17–21].)
Due to the tradeoff between complexity and scale,
any mechanism that creates larger-scale complexity—
whether market or government or otherwise—will nec-
essarily reduce individual complexity. This is not to say
that larger-scale complexity is always harmful; it is often
worth trading some individual-level freedoms for larger-
scale cooperation. When, then, is complexity at a par-
ticular scale desirable?
3 A subtle point to be made here is that introducing interactions
between two parts of a system may in some cases increase the set
of relevant individual behaviors of each part, thereby increasing
the total area under the complexity profile. For example, if two
people enter into communication with each other, the commu-
nication itself (e.g. speech) may now be a relevant behavior of
each individual person that was not there before.
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FIG. 4. Schematic complexity profiles of militaries in con-
flict. Top: If two armies are operating with the same number
of possible behaviors but at different scales, the larger-scale
one is favored. Middle: If two armies are operating at the
same scale but with different numbers of possible behaviors,
the higher-complexity one is favored. Bottom: If two armies
are operating at different scales and with different numbers
of possible behaviors, which one is favored depends on the
terrain (see text). Note that these profiles are simplified to
highlight the key concepts; actual militaries operate at multi-
ple scales. More generally, the top and middle graphs depict
conflicts in which one army has at least as much complexity
as the other at every scale.
E. Why be complex?
A determination of when complexity is desirable is pro-
vided by the Law of Requisite Variety [22]: To be effec-
tive, a system must be at least as complex as the envi-
ronmental behaviors to which it must differentially react.
If a system must be able to provide a different response
to each of 100 environmental possibilities and the sys-
tem has only 10 possible actions, the system will not be
effective. At the very least the system would need 100
possible actions, one for each scenario it could encounter.
(The above condition is necessary but of course not suf-
ficient; a system with sufficiently many actions may still
not take the right actions in the right circumstances.)
Note that the environment to which a system must react
is itself also a system and will sometimes be referred to
as such.
Since complexity is defined only with respect to a par-
ticular scale, we can refine the Law of Requisite Variety:
To be effective, a system must match (or exceed) the
complexity of the environmental behaviors to which it
must differentially react at all scales for which these be-
haviors occur [9]. To illustrate this multi-scale version of
the Law of Requisite Variety, we consider military con-
flict [23] (see fig. 4). Here, one military can be considered
as the system, while the other military is part of the en-
vironment with which the system must interact. For two
militaries of equal complexity, i.e. with the same number
of behaviors, but with one military operating at a larger
scale (e.g. two very tightly controlled armies, but with
one army larger than the other), the larger-scale mili-
tary will likely win. For two militaries of equal scale but
unequal complexity (e.g. two equally sized and equally
powered fleets, but with one being more maneuverable
than the other), the higher-complexity military will likely
win, since the high-complexity military has an action for
every action of the lower-complexity military but not vice
versa. When a military with high complexity at a smaller
scale (e.g. a guerrilla force) conflicts with a military with
larger-scale behavior but lower complexity (e.g. the U.S.
army in Vietnam or the Soviet army in Afghanistan), the
terrain, which constrains the scale of the conflict, plays
an important role. In an open field, or in open waters,
the military that has more complexity at the larger scales
is favored, while in the jungle or in the mountains, higher
complexity at smaller scales is favored.
As another example, healthcare involves both small-
scale tasks with high overall complexity such as case man-
agement, as well as large-scale, lower complexity tasks,
such as manufacturing and delivering vaccines [24]. (De-
livering vaccines is lower complexity but higher scale be-
cause the same actions will be performed for nearly ev-
eryone.) Large-scale top-down organizations and initia-
tives are suited for large-scale, lower complexity tasks,
but tasks like case management require health systems
with a high degree of small-scale (i.e. local) complexity.
The eurozone provides a potential illustration of a
multi-scale complexity mismatch. Fiscal policy is made
predominantly at the scale of individual countries and
thus has a higher complexity at the country scale but
relatively little complexity at the scale of the entire eu-
rozone, while monetary policy is made at the scale of the
entire eurozone and thus has some complexity at the scale
of the eurozone but lacks the ability to vary (i.e. lacks
complexity) at the scale of individual countries. Many
have argued that economic difficulties within the euro-
zone have arisen because this mismatch has precluded
effective interactions between fiscal and monetary pol-
icy [25–29].
Problems arise not from too much or too little com-
plexity (at any scale) per se but rather from mismatches
between the complexities of a task to be performed
and the complexities of the system performing that
task.4 Note that the system in one scenario may be
the task/environment in another; for instance, the same
complexity that helps a system interact with its envi-
ronment may prevent its effective management by other
systems. In none of the above examples have the com-
4 Incidentally, human emotions appear to reflect this principle: we
are bored when our environment is too simple and overwhelmed
when it is too complex [30].
6plexity profiles been precisely calculated, nor have scales
been precisely defined. Instead, proxies for scale are used
and estimated comparisons of complexity made. Such
an approach cannot yield precise results (indeed, no ap-
proach can, given the complexity a full description of such
systems would require), but additional precision is not
needed when even the approximate analysis reveals large
mismatches in complexity.5 (To remedy the diagnosed
mismatches, more detailed analyses may be required.)
While it may be tempting to attribute the problems aris-
ing from a complexity mismatch to particular proximate
causes and chains of events, problems of one form or an-
other will be inevitable unless the underlying mismatch
is addressed.
F. Subdivided systems
Even if the complexity of the system matches that of
its environment at the appropriate scales, there is still
the possibility of a complexity mismatch. Consider two
pairs of friends—four people total, each of whom can lift
100 pounds—and consider two 200-pound couches that
need to be moved. Furthermore, assume that each per-
son is able to coordinate with her friend but not with ei-
ther of the other two people. Overall then, the system of
people has sufficient complexity at the appropriate scales
to move both couches since each pair of friends can lift
one of the 200-pound couches. However, were one person
from each pair of friends to be assigned to each couch,
they would not be able to lift the couches because the two
people lifting each couch would not belong to the same
pair of friends and thus would not be able to coordinate
their actions. The problem here is that while the pairs
of friends possess enough overall complexity at the right
scales to lift the couches, the subdivision within the sys-
tem of friends is not matched to the natural subdivision
within the system of couches. The mismatch in complex-
ity can be seen if we focus our attention on just a single
couch: while the couch requires coordinated action at the
scale of 200 pounds, the two people lifting it are capable
only of two independent actions, each at the scale of 100
pounds.
The way in which academic departments are organized
provides a more realistic example of the potential of sub-
division mismatch. Academia has multiple levels of sub-
division (departments, subfields, etc.) in order to or-
ganize knowledge and coordinate people, resulting in a
5 Just as this analysis of the space of possible behaviors can be
used even in the face of uncertainty regarding a system’s precise
mechanisms and outcomes, physicists can use the property of en-
tropy (sometimes considering how quantities related to entropy
change across scale) to classify phase transitions even when they
cannot, from first principles, determine precise quantities such as
the amount of heat generated by a phase transition or the tem-
perature at which it occurs (such quantities must be determined
empirically).
high overall degree of complexity across multiple scales,
where scale could refer to either the number of coordi-
nated people or the amount of coordinated knowledge,
depending on which aspect of the academic system is un-
der consideration. Similarly, there are multiple levels of
natural subdivision in the set of problems that academia
can potentially address, with each subdivision of prob-
lems requiring particular types of coordinated knowledge
and effort in order to be solved. Academia’s complex-
ity across multiple scales allows it to effectively work
on many of these problems. However, there may exist
problems that academia, despite having sufficient overall
multi-scale complexity, is nonetheless unable to solve be-
cause the subdivisions within the problem do not match
the subdivisions within academia. The increase in in-
terdisciplinary centers and initiatives over the past few
decades suggests the perception of such a mismatch; how-
ever, the structure of the academic system as a whole may
still hinder progress on problems that do not fall neatly
within a discipline or sub-discipline [31–36].
The above examples provide an illustration of the prin-
ciple that in order for a system to differentially react to
a certain set of behaviors in its environment, not only
must the system as a whole have at least as much com-
plexity at all scales as this set of environmental behav-
iors (as described in section II E), but also each subset
of the system must have at least as much complexity at
all scales as the environmental behaviors corresponding
to that subset. A good rule of thumb for applying this
principle is that decisions concerning independent parts
or aspects of a system should be able to be made indepen-
dently, while decisions concerning dependent parts of the
system should be made dependently. It follows that the
organizations that make such decisions should be subdi-
vided accordingly, so that their subdivisions match the
natural divisions in the systems with which they inter-
act.6
G. Hierarchies
A common way in which systems are organized is
through hierarchies. In an idealized hierarchy, there are
no lateral connections: any decision that involves mul-
tiple components of the hierarchy must pass through a
common node under whose control these components all
(directly or indirectly) lie. The complexity profile of such
a hierarchy depends on the rigidity of the control struc-
ture (fig. 5). At one extreme, every decision, no matter
how large or small, is made by those at the top of the
6 The subdivisions present in the human brain and the analysis of
subdivisions in neural networks more generally [1, Chapters 2.4-
2.5] demonstrate how systems that are subdivided so as to match
the natural subdivisions in their environments outperform those
with more internal connectivity.
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FIG. 5. Complexity profiles of two hierarchies, each with
the same number of people. Here, the scale is the number
of coordinated man-hours. In one hierarchy, all decisions,
regardless of the scale, are made by a single person, while in
the other, different decisions are made at various levels of the
hierarchy.
hierarchy. This hierarchy has the same amount of com-
plexity across all its scales: namely the complexity of
whatever decisions are being made at the top. At the
other extreme, there is no communication within the hi-
erarchy, and every individual acts independently. This
hierarchy has very little complexity beyond the individ-
ual level. Between these two extremes is a typical hier-
archy, in which different decisions are made at different
levels.
No type of hierarchy is inherently better than any
other. For a particular environment, the best hierarchy
is one for which the complexity profile matches that of
the tasks needed to be performed. A tightly controlled
(top-heavy) hierarchy is not well suited to environments
in which there is a lot of variation in the systems with
which the lower levels of the hierarchy must interact; nei-
ther is a very loosely controlled hierarchy well suited to
environments that require large-scale coordinated action.
For example, centralizing too much power within the U.S.
governance system at the federal (as opposed to the lo-
cal or state) level would not allow for sufficient smaller-
scale complexity to match the variation among locales;
too decentralized a governance system would not allow
for sufficient larger-scale complexity to engage with prob-
lems that require nationally coordinated responses.7 As-
signing decisions to higher levels in hierarchies allows for
7 We can consider not just the overall complexity profile of gov-
ernance systems but also how well the subdivisions in gover-
nance systems match those within their territories (section II F).
Metropolitan areas are in some ways more similar to one another
than they are to the rural areas of their respective states. So
more efficiency and scale, but such decisions result in less
adaptability because when they are incorrect, they affect
more of the system and—as larger-scale changes tend to
require longer time-scales to enact—are more difficult to
roll back.
It is important to distinguish between the complexity
of a hierarchy and the complexity of the decisions that
the people within the hierarchy are capable of making.
For instance, one could design a tightly controlled hierar-
chy that could take a large number of large-scale actions
(i.e. high complexity at its largest scale), but since the
decision-making abilities of even the most capable hu-
mans are of finite complexity, the individuals at the top
may be fundamentally unable to correctly choose from
among these actions. This brings us to an important
limitation of hierarchies: the complexity of the decisions
concerning the largest-scale behaviors of a hierarchy—the
behaviors involving the entire organization—is limited
by the complexity of the group of people at the top [7].
Thus, a hierarchy will necessarily fail when the complex-
ity of matching its largest-scale behaviors to those of its
environment8 is higher than the complexity of decision-
making that is achievable by any individual or commit-
tee. The failure of command economies provides a stark
example: the allocation of resources and labor is too com-
plex a problem for any one person or group of people to
understand. Markets allocate resources via a more net-
worked system: decisions regarding how to allocate re-
sources are made without any individual making them,
just as decisions are made in the human brain without
any neuron making them. (Whether or not these market
allocations are desirable depends in part on the way in
which the market is structured and regulated.)
We began by considering idealized hierarchies with
only vertical connections, but lateral connections pro-
vide another mechanism for enabling larger-scale behav-
iors. For instance, cities can interact with one another
(rather than interacting only with their state and na-
while dividing the U.S. into 50 states provides substantial lower-
scale governmental complexity, this complexity is not necessarily
well matched to natural urban-rural divides. To the extent that
such a mismatch exists, there may be issues currently handled
at the state level that would be better handled at the local level,
thereby allowing for different policies in urban and rural areas
(and likewise, perhaps some of the powers that some argue should
be devolved from the federal to the state level should in fact be
devolved to the local level).
8 Note that the complexity of deciding which behaviors of a sys-
tem should correspond to which behaviors of its environment is
generally much greater than the complexity of either the sys-
tem or the environment alone: for example, if both the sys-
tem and environment have 10 possible behaviors, the system has
enough complexity to match the environment, but properly de-
ciding which behaviors of the system should correspond to which
environmental conditions requires correctly choosing one option
out of a space of 3,628,800 (10 factorial) possibilities. The space
of possible behaviors of a system and its environment may be
much smaller than the space of possible decisions concerning the
management of the system’s actions in its environment.
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FIG. 6. A complexity profile of a system with a separation
of scales. A separation of scales implies that the behaviors
occurring below a certain scale (s0 in the above figure) are at
larger scales mostly independent from one another and that
therefore, at these larger scales, only the average effects of the
small-scale behaviors are relevant.
tional governments) in order to copy good policies and
learn from each other’s mistakes. Through these sorts of
evolutionary processes (described further in section IV),
large-scale decisions (large-scale because policies may be
copied by multiple cities) that are more complex than any
individual component can be made. Such lateral connec-
tions can exist within a hierarchical framework in which
the top of the hierarchy (in this example, the national
government) maintains significant control, or they can
exist outside of a hierarchical structure, as in the human
brain. Furthermore, these lateral connections can vary in
strength. Overly strong connections lead to herd-like be-
haviors with insufficient smaller-scale variation, such as
groupthink [37–39] (no system is exempt from the trade-
off described in section II D), while overly weak connec-
tions result in mostly independent behavior with little
coordination.
III. ANALYZING COMPLEX SYSTEMS
The previous section has examined some of the general
properties of systems with many components. But how
do we study particular systems? How do we analyze data
from complex systems, and how do we choose which data
to analyze?
A. How do we understand any system?
In a sense, it is surprising that we can understand any
macroscopic system at all, as even a very simple mechan-
ical system has trillions upon trillions of molecules. We
are able to understand such systems because they pos-
sess a separation of scales [40], meaning that the macro-
scopic behavior we are interested in occurs at a far larger
scale than the behavior of the individual molecules, with
not much behavior occurring in between these two scales
(see fig. 6). This separation allows us to treat the macro-
scopic and microscopic behaviors separately: for mechan-
ical systems, we treat the macroscopic behavior explicitly
with Newtonian mechanics, while the microscopic behav-
ior is considered in aggregate using thermodynamics.
More generally, the approach described above is an
example of a mean-field theory [41], in which the av-
erage behaviors of a system’s components are explicitly
modeled and the deviations of the individual components
from this average are treated as statistically independent
random fluctuations. This approach works very well for
systems such as computers, cars, airplanes, and build-
ings, in which the motions of individual molecules are—
apart from some mostly uncorrelated fluctuations—well
described by the motion of the piece of material to which
they belong. Mean-field assumptions are also often em-
ployed in analyses of biological, social, and economic sys-
tems; these assumptions work well in many cases, but, as
we will see, they are not always appropriate for complex
systems. It is important, therefore, to determine under
what conditions mean-field theory holds.
B. When mean-field theory breaks down
The systems for which mean-field theory applies ex-
hibit large-scale behaviors that are the average of the
behaviors of their components. They must possess a sep-
aration of scales, which arises when the statistical fluc-
tuations of their components are sufficiently independent
from one another above a certain scale. Mean-field the-
ory may hold even in the presence of strong interactions,
so long as the effect of those strong interactions can be
captured by the average behavior of the system—that is,
so long as each component of the system can be modeled
as if it were interacting with the average (i.e. mean field)
of the system. For example, the large-scale motion of
solids is well described by mean-field theory, even though
the molecules in a solid interact with one another quite
strongly, because the main effect of these interactions is
to keep each molecule at a certain distance and orien-
tation from the average location (center of mass) of the
solid. Likewise, under some (but certainly not all) condi-
tions, economic markets can be effectively described by
modeling each market actor as interacting with the ag-
gregate forces of supply and demand rather than with
other individual market actors.
However, when there are sufficiently strong correla-
tions between the components of the system, i.e. when
the interactions between a component of the system and
a specific set of other components (as opposed to its gen-
eral interaction with the rest of the system) cannot be ne-
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FIG. 7. A normal distribution (thin-tailed) and a distribution
with a power-law decay (fat-tailed). The fat-tailed distribu-
tion may appear more stable, due to the lower probability of
small-scale fluctuations and the fact that samples from the
distribution may not contain any extreme events. However,
sooner or later, a fat-tailed distribution will produce an ex-
treme event, while one could wait thousands of lifetimes of the
universe before a normal distribution produces a similarly ex-
treme event. Note that the axes of this graph are truncated;
the illustrated fat-tailed distribution can, with small but non-
negligible probability (0.04%), produce events with a scale of
one million or more.
glected, mean-field theory will break down.9 These sys-
tems will instead exhibit large-scale behaviors that arise
not solely from the properties of individual components
but also from the relationships between components. For
example, while the behavior of a muscle can be roughly
understood from the behavior of an individual muscle
cell, the behavior of the human brain is fundamentally
different from that of individual neurons, because cog-
nitive behaviors are determined largely by variations in
the synapses between neurons. Similarly, the complex
ecological behaviors of a forest cannot be determined by
the behaviors of its constituent organisms in isolation.
Because their small-scale random occurrences are not
statistically independent, complex systems often exhibit
large-scale fluctuations not predicted by mean-field the-
ory, such as forest fires, viral content on social media, and
crashes in economic markets. Sometimes, these large-
scale fluctuations are adaptive: they enable a system to
collectively respond to small inputs [42]. (For instance,
humans respond strongly to minor disturbances in the
density of air, such as the sound of their own names.)
9 Incidentally, the failure of mean-field theory to describe cer-
tain physical phase transitions led physicists to develop a new,
multi-scale approach (the renormalization group), a foundation
of much of complex systems science.
However, these large-scale fluctuations sometimes pose
systemic risks.
C. Fat-tailed distributions and systemic risk
When the components of a system are independent
from one another above a certain scale, then at much
larger scales, the magnitude of the fluctuations of the sys-
tem follow a normal distribution (bell curve),10 for which
the mean and standard deviation are well-defined and for
which events many standard deviations above the mean
are astronomically improbable. Interdependencies, how-
ever, can lead to a distribution of fluctuations in which
the probability of an extreme event, while still small, is
not astronomically so. Such distributions are character-
ized as fat-tailed—see fig. 7. For example, while human
height follows a thin-tailed distribution, with no record of
anyone over twice as tall as the average human, human
wealth—due to the complex economic interactions be-
tween individuals—follows a fat-tailed distribution, with
multiple individuals deviating from the average by fac-
tors of more than one million [43].
One danger of interdependencies is that they may make
systems appear more stable in the short term by reduc-
ing the extent of small-scale fluctuations, while actually
increasing the probability of catastrophic failure [44–47].
This danger is compounded by the fact that when un-
derlying probability distributions have fat tails (a situ-
ation made more likely by interdependencies), standard
statistical methods often break down, leading to poten-
tially severe underestimates of the probabilities of ex-
treme events [48].11 As a thought experiment, imagine
100 ladders, each with a 1/10 probability of falling. If
the ladders are independent from one another, the prob-
ability that all of them fall is astronomically low (literally
so: there is about a 1020 times higher chance of randomly
selecting a particular atom out of all of the atoms in the
known universe). If we tie all the ladders together, we will
have made them safer, in the sense that the probability
of any individual ladder falling will be much smaller, but
we will have also created a non-negligible chance that all
of the ladders might fall down together. Other examples
include the interconnectedness of our financial systems
resulting in the possibility of global market crashes [49–
54] and the interconnectedness of travel routes increasing
the probability of pandemics such as the Spanish flu and
COVID-19 [55, 56]. When such crises do occur, they are
often attributed to proximate causes or chains of events,
and measures are then implemented to ensure that those
10 This follows from the central limit theorem.
11 For instance, the mean and variance of a fat-tailed distribution
may not be well-defined, and even if they are, they may not be
able to be reliably estimated from a finite sample due to the like-
lihood of a single data point or lack thereof substantially skewing
the estimate.
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particular chains of events will not occur again. But un-
less the underlying systemic instabilities are addressed,
another crisis is bound to happen sooner or later, even if
its precise form cannot be predicted.
D. Understanding complex systems
Because it is usually easier to collect data regarding
components of a system than it is to collect data regard-
ing interactions between components, studies often fail
to capture the information relevant to complex systems,
since complex large-scale behaviors critically depend on
such interactions. Furthermore, as discussed in sec-
tion III C, data analysis can severely underestimate the
probability of extreme events (tail risk). Finally, analy-
ses often (implicitly) assume linearity, i.e. they assume
that the total impact of a set of factors is equal to the
sum of the impacts of each individual factor, an assump-
tion that often breaks down for complex systems, which
may possess feedback loops, abrupt transitions (tipping
points), and other highly nonlinear behaviors [57–64].
How can we understand the systems for which these
standard approaches do not apply? Our understanding
of all systems with many components depends on uni-
versality [65], i.e. the existence of large-scale behaviors
that do not depend on the microscopic details. The stan-
dard approaches are predicated on the assumption of suf-
ficient independence between components, which allows
large-scale behaviors to be determined without a full ac-
counting of the system’s details via mean-field theory.12
But mean-field theory is just one example of universality.
Sound is another example: all materials, regardless of
their composition, allow for the propagation of sound
waves. Sound behaves so similarly in all materials be-
cause at the length scales relevant to sound waves, which
are far larger than the sizes of individual atoms and
molecules, the effect of the microscopic parameters is
merely to set the speed of the sound.13 Note that sound
waves cannot be understood as a property of the average
behavior—in this case, average density—of a material,
since it is precisely the systematic correlations in the de-
viations from that average that give rise to sound. Nor is
sound best understood by focusing on the small-scale de-
tails of atomic motion: scientists understood sound even
12 Formally, the statistical fluctuations of the components must,
above a certain scale, be sufficiently independent so as to satisfy
the assumptions of the central limit theorem. The central limit
theorem is the manifestation of universality that explains the
ubiquity of normal distributions.
13 For Quantum Electrodynamics (the theory of how light and elec-
trons interact), we still do not know the microscopic details.
Yet we can nonetheless make predictions accurate to ten decimal
places because, as can be shown with renormalization group the-
ory, the only effect of these microscopic details at the scales at
which we can make measurements is to set the electron mass and
charge—quantities that, like the speed of sound in any particular
material, can be measured (but not predicted).
FIG. 8. A figure from Lim et al.’s paper on ethnic vio-
lence [66]. The sites where their model predicts a potential
for ethnic violence are shown in red in panels C and D, with
confirmed reports of ethnic violence depicted by the yellow
dots in panel D.
before they learned what atoms are. The key to under-
standing sound waves is to recognize that they have a
multi-scale structure—with larger-scale fluctuations cor-
responding to lower frequencies and smaller-scale fluctua-
tions corresponding to higher frequencies—and to model
them accordingly.
Lim et al. apply this approach to studying ethnic vi-
olence [66]. They built a predictive model to analyze
where ethnic violence has the potential to occur and ap-
plied their model to India and to what was Yugoslavia.
Ethnic violence has many causes, but rather than focus-
ing on specific, culturally dependent mechanisms or on
the average properties of regions, such as demographic
or economic statistics, the authors instead considered the
multi-scale patterns in how ethnic groups were geographi-
cally distributed (fig. 8). They found that ethnic violence
did not occur when the ethnic groups were either well
mixed or well separated but rather occurred only when
ethnic groups separated into geographic patches,14 with
the violence most likely to occur for geographic patches
of a particular size.15 Although not explicitly included
in the analysis, specific details of a region are relevant
insofar as they are either a cause or an effect (or both)
of the patch size.16
14 This separation falls into the same universality class as the sep-
aration of oil and water.
15 This analysis implies that ethnic violence can be prevented by
the use of well-placed political boundaries, as in Switzerland [67].
16 For instance, animosity between two ethnic groups, though not
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FIG. 9. A representative complexity profile of a complex sys-
tem. Understanding all the details (i.e. all of the small-scale
behaviors) is impossible and unnecessary; the most important
information is contained in the large-scale behaviors. How-
ever, for systems for which mean-field theory does not apply,
characterizing these behaviors will involve more than a simple
average.
Understanding all of the details of any complex sys-
tem is impossible, just as it is for most systems with a
separation of scales; there is just too much complexity at
the smallest scale. But unlike the behaviors of systems
with a separation of scales, the important large-scale be-
haviors of complex systems are not simply the average
of their small-scale behaviors. The interdependencies at
multiple scales can make it difficult or impossible to pre-
cisely understand how small-scale behaviors give rise to
larger-scale ones, but even for complex systems, there is
much less complexity at the larger scales than there is at
the smaller scales. Thus, there will always be large-scale
behaviors that do not depend on most of the system’s
details (see fig. 9). The key to analyzing these behaviors
is to find the appropriate mathematical (or conceptual)
description—i.e. to identify variables that describe the
relevant space of possible (large-scale) behaviors—which
for complex systems is not a simple average nor a full ac-
count of all the details. For additional examples of this
multi-scale approach, see ref. [40].
IV. COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND UNCERTAINTY
Although the principles discussed throughout sec-
tions II and III help us recognize the fundamental prop-
erties and limitations of systems, our understanding of
explicitly considered, may be a cause as well as a consequence of
the geographic segregation [68].
most complex systems will inevitably be imperfect. And
regardless of how well-considered a plan is, a truly com-
plex system will present elements that were not consid-
ered ahead of time.17 Given the absence of perfect knowl-
edge, how can the success of systems we design or are part
of be assured? While the success of many systems rests
on the assumption that good decisions will be made, some
systems do not depend on individual understanding and
can perform well in spite of the fallibility of decision-
makers (whether due to corruption, subconscious bias,
or the fundamental limitations of human minds). The
study of complex systems approaches this observation
scientifically by (implicitly or explicitly) considering the
decision-makers themselves as part of the system and of
limited complexity/decision-making ability. The ques-
tion thus becomes: how do we design systems that exceed
the complexity of the decision-makers within them?
A. Evolutionary processes
While uncertainty makes most systems weaker, some
systems benefit from uncertainty and variability [69–72].
The common characteristic of these systems is their em-
bodiment of some sort of evolutionary process, i.e. a
process in which successful changes are copied (and fur-
ther modified) while unsuccessful changes are not. The
classic evolutionary processes are biological: due to vari-
ability introduced by random mutations, organisms with
the complexity and scale of humans evolved from single-
celled organisms. Furthermore, humans themselves have
the property of benefiting from exposure to random
shocks (provided the shocks are not too strong). Im-
mune system performance is improved by early expo-
sure to non-lethal pathogens [73, 74]; muscles and bones
are strengthened by micro-tears and micro-fractures, re-
spectively; we learn by exposure to new information and
problem-solving; and our psychologies are strengthened
by exposure to adversity, provided the adversity is not
too severe [75, 76].
Competitive market economies provide another exam-
ple of how systems can thrive on uncertainty. Due to
our ignorance of which will succeed, many potential in-
novations and businesses must be created and improved
upon in parallel, the successful ones expanding and the
unsuccessful ones failing. The successful among these can
then be improved upon in the same manner—with many
17 It should also be noted that in a functional system with a high
degree of complexity, the potential positive impact of a change is
generally much smaller than its potential negative impact. For
example, a change to the wiring in a computer is unlikely to
dramatically improve the computer’s performance, but it could
cause the computer to crash. Airplanes are another example.
This phenomenon is a consequence of the fact that, by definition,
a high degree of complexity implies that there are many system
configurations that will not work for every one configuration that
will.
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approaches being applied at once—and so on. (How-
ever, without effectively regulated multi-scale coopera-
tive frameworks—see section IV B—large-scale parts of
the economic system may optimize for the wrong goals,
settling into harmful societal equilibria [77, 78].)
Likewise, the internal processes of large organizations
may follow an evolutionary pattern in which small parts
of the organization can fail and thus be improved upon;
without such flexibility, the entire organization may fail
at once in the face of a changing internal or external
environment. In some cases the failure of the entire or-
ganization makes room for more effective organizations
to take its place (assuming the economy is sufficiently de-
centralized and competitive so that the organization in
question is not “too big to fail”). The collapse of govern-
ment is generally not one of those cases, however [79], so
it is especially important that governance systems pos-
sess the flexibility to internally benefit from randomness
and uncertainty. Perhaps counterintuitively, not allowing
small failures to occur may weaken systems in the long
run by halting evolutionary processes and by creating in-
terdependencies that lead to systemic risk (section III C).
In order to thrive in uncertainty and exceed the com-
plexity of individual decision-making, systems can incor-
porate evolutionary processes so that they, even if very
limited at first, will naturally improve over time. The
first step is to allow for enough variation in the system,
so that the system can explore the space of possibilities.
Since a large amount of variation means a lot of complex-
ity and complexity trades off with scale (section II D),
such variation must occur at smaller scales (in both space
and time). For example, in the case of governance, en-
abling each city to experiment independently allows for
many plans to be tried out in parallel and to be iterated
upon. The opposite strategy would be to enact one na-
tional plan, the effects of which will not be able to be
comparatively evaluated.
The second step is to allow for a means of communica-
tion between various parts of the system so that success-
ful choices are adopted elsewhere and built upon (e.g.
cities copying the successful practices of other cities).
Plans will always have unintended consequences; the key
is to allow unintended consequences to work for rather
than against the system as a whole. The desire for di-
rect control must often be relinquished in order to allow
complexity to autonomously increase over time.18
B. Multi-scale evolutionary processes
Successful evolutionary processes generally do not con-
sist of unbridled competition but rather contain both
18 Systems can explicitly design only systems of lesser complexity
since an explicit design is itself a behavior of the first system.
However, systems that evolve over time can become more com-
plex than their designers.
Collaboration
between players
Competition
between players
Competition between players
vying for the same position
Figure 2.
We can generalize these figures to recognize that there is a multilevel picture that
illustrates the interplay of competition and cooperation. As shown in the third figure the
competition between sports is what gives rise to the collaboration between teams, the
competition between teams gives rise to collaboration between players. Conversely
cooperation at each level enables competition at the higher level of organization. At the
same time competition and collaboration are antagonistic when they take place at the
same of organization unless they are made `orthogonal’ referring to different times or
types of behavior.
Team collaboration
enables the sport
to exist and compete
Competition
between sports
Competition between sports
for fan attention and money
increases team collaboration
Collaboration of
players enables
teams to compete
Competition between teams
causes selection of teams
 with collaborating players
Collaboration
between teams
Competition
between teams
Collaboration
between players
Competition
between players
Figure 3.
The key point is that competition and cooperation always occur together at different
levels of organization This topic might be so intuitive to some of you that you are
wondering why I am talking about this at all. Surprisingly, it has not been clear to many
in the context of scientific dialog about evolution. Even if understood intuitively in
sports, and even if some scientists understand this intuitively as well, it is important to
state clearly these basic relationships.
How does this help us make effective teams? The answer is, self-evident. Effective
teams form naturally when there is a process of evolutionary selection of teams that
perform well in competition. This may be a useful lesson for those who try hard to
compel player behavior in one way or another. While I do not want to say that teaching
is not important. Still, it is the role of competition itself to teach about cooperation. I
would also say, that evolution teaches us something about the proper place of rewards
for effective competition. The main reward is simply the right to stay together. This,
after all, is what survival, survival of a collective, is all about.
FIG. 10. An illustration from ref. [16, Chapter 7] showing the
interplay between cooperation and competition in the context
of sports teams and league .
competition and cooperation, each occurring at multiple
scales [80]. For ex mpl , cells coop rate within mul icel-
lular organisms in order to more effectively compete with
other organisms, and organisms cooperate both within
a d between species in order to more effectively com-
pete against other sp i . Competition at larger scal s
naturally breeds cooperation at smaller scales because in
order for a group to effectively compete against another
group (large-scale competition), there must be coopera-
tion within the group. Cooperation can also breed com-
petition since sometimes the best way for the group to
achieve its shared goals is to facilitate some healthy com-
petition among its subgroups. Those subgroups must
foster cooperation within themselves in order to effec-
tively compete with each other, and they too may be
able to increase the effectiveness of their internal coop-
eration by introducing some healthy competition among
their members (fig. 10 provides an example). If these
members are themselves groups, the process of compe-
tition begetting cooperation that begets more competi-
tion can continue to even smaller scales. This process
can work in reverse as well: in order for individuals to
compete more effectively, they may cooperate with each
other to form groups, which in turn may cooperate to
form even larger groups, and so on. Thus, a complex
network of cooperation and competition among groups
of various sizes (scales) can naturally evolve.
In order to promote effective group cooperation, com-
petition must be properly structured. A soccer team in
which the players compete with their own team mem-
bers to score goals will not be effective, but one in which
the players compete for the title of the most fit may
be. The framework in which competition occurs must
be structured so that the competitors are incentivized
to take actions that are net good for the group; other-
wise a kind of tragedy-of-the-commons situation occurs.
The potential for competition to go awry highlights the
importance of having a multi-scale structure with com-
petition occurring on multiple levels, rather than having
everyone in the system compete with everyone else. With
the multi-scale structure, groups with unhealthy evolu-
tionary dynamics are selected against, while groups with
a healthy mix of competition and cooperation that bene-
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fits the entire group are selected for.19 Market economic
systems are successful not because free markets produce
optimal outcomes (real-world markets often sharply de-
viate from the assumptions of free-market models, and
externalities abound) but rather because, at their best,
appropriately regulated market systems allow for multi-
scale evolutionary processes to naturally arise, resulting
in innovations and complexity far beyond what anyone
could have imagined, let alone designed.
V. FURTHER READING
Complex systems science, also known as complexity
science, contains many subfields. One starting point for
exploring complex systems more broadly is this click-
able map [83] of complex systems science and related
fields. Encyclopedias [84, 85] and textbooks [1, 86–
90] provide a range of perspectives. In addition to
the topics and references discussed throughout this in-
troduction, we provide a selection among the many
works applying complex systems science to social sys-
tems and policy [91–105] and management [106–109].
Complex systems science includes, among others, the
fields of system dynamics [110], evolutionary dynam-
ics [3, 111, 112], network science [113], fractals and
scaling [114–117], urban science [118], pattern forma-
tion [119, 120], econophysics [121], and nonlinear dynam-
ics and chaos [122, 123]. Book series on complex systems
topics include the Santa Fe Institute Series and Unifying
Themes in Complex Systems.
VI. SUMMARY
Systems with many components often exhibit emer-
gent large-scale behaviors that cannot be directly in-
ferred from the behaviors of their components. However,
an early insight of statistical physics is that in spite of
the impossibility of describing the details of trillions of
molecules, the macroscopic properties of the molecules
can be well understood by analyzing their space of pos-
sible behaviors, rather than their specific configurations
and motions. While many macroscopic properties can
be described in terms of the average behaviors of the
molecules, the macroscopic properties of certain physi-
cal phenomena, such as phase transitions, cannot be un-
derstood by averaging over system components; accord-
ingly, physicists were forced to develop new, multi-scale
methods. Likewise, while standard statistical methods—
which infer the average properties of a system’s many
19 There is evidence that the geographic nature of evolution—in
which organisms evolve in somewhat separated environments and
mean-field theory does not apply—has resulted in precisely this
multi-scale structure and has therefore allowed for the evolution
of genuine (e.g. not reciprocal) altruistic behavior [81, 82].
components—can succesfully model some biological and
social systems, they fail for others, sometimes spectacu-
larly so.
Taking a systemic view by considering the space of pos-
sible behaviors can yield insights that cannot be gleaned
by considering only the proximate causes and effects of
particular problems or crises. A system’s complexity—
which depends on its number of distinct potential be-
haviors (i.e. on the space of possibilities)—is a start-
ing point from which to get a handle on its large-scale
properties, in the same way that entropy is the start-
ing point for statistical physics. Because the number of
distinct behaviors of a system depends on the level of de-
tail (behaviors that appear the same at lower resolution
may be distinct at higher resolution), complexity depends
on scale. Interdependencies between components reduce
complexity at smaller scales by restricting the freedom
of individual components while creating complexity at
larger scales by enabling behaviors that involve multiple
components working together. Thus, for systems that
consist of the same components, there is a fundamental
tradeoff between the number of behaviors at smaller and
larger scales. This tradeoff among scales is related to the
tradeoff between a system’s adaptability, which depends
on the variety of different responses it has to internal and
external disturbances, and its efficiency, which depends
on its operating scale. There is no ideal scale at which
a system should possess complexity; rather, the most ef-
fective systems are those that at each scale match the
complexity of their environments.
When analyzing data or creating organizational struc-
tures, standard methods fail when they underestimate
the importance of interdependencies and the complexity
that arises from these interdependencies. To some extent,
these problems can be mitigated by matching the data
analysis or organizational structure to natural divisions
within the system of interest. Since complex systems are
those for which behaviors occur over multiple scales, suc-
cessful organizations and analyses for complex systems
must also be multi-scale in nature. However, even when
armed with all the proper information and tools, human
understanding of most complex systems will inevitably
fall short, with unpredictability being the best predic-
tion. To confront this reality, we must design systems
that are robust to the ignorance of their designers and
that, like evolution, are strengthened rather than weak-
ened by unpredictability. Such systems are flexible with
multiple processes occurring in parallel; these processes
may compete with one another within a multi-scale coop-
erative framework such that effective practices are repli-
cated. Only these systems—that grow in complexity over
time from trial and error and the input of many—exhibit
the necessary complexity to solve problems that exceed
the limits of human comprehension.
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